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ABSTRACT  
Political scientists generally agree that contiguity is a significant predictor of 
interstate conflict; that is, they observe that it is neighbors that most frequently fight 
one another. Defining contiguity, however, is an unsettled matter. Still dominating 
conflict studies is the view that neighbors are those who share physical borders, or 
spatial delineations, between one sovereign territory and another. Yet an 
increasingly integrated international system, accompanied with shifting political 
identities and technological advances in communication and transport, suggest that 
power relations are more than a function of sheer corporeal distance. To anticipate 
contemporary interstate relations, therefore, we might tap the potential of 
constructivist theory to derive new understanding of what it means to be a neighbor. 
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 Introduction 
The contemporary international system, still dubbed generally and most 
simply as the post-cold war world, challenges scholars to reconstruct 
appropriate frameworks for organizing, understanding, and predicting 
international relations. There is an almost slap-happy attempt to coin an 
appropriate name to this new system as well. With focus on the integration 
of states, free markets, and shared information technologies, one observer 
suggests that the new system with its own logic, rules, structures and 
characteristics be called an era of ―globalution‖ (Friedman 1999). Another 
describes the international system as ―uni-multipolar,‖ consisting of one 
superpower and several major powers, all of which are locked in to 
inevitable clashes or coalescence of cultures (Huntington 1999). Still others 
propose ―zones of peace and turmoil‖ or a ―world of tiers‖ in which a 
common worldview and preference for market democracy sets one group of 
states apart from another (Singer and Wildavsky 1996; Snow 1999). Further, 
to capture the paradoxical effects of fragmentation and integration wrought 
by the process of globalization, one scholar develops the concept of 
―fragmegration‖ (Rosenau 2003). There are scores of other labels and 
analyses. 
Regardless of the nomenclature and the distinctions between various 
frameworks, most observers agree that while division marked the cold-war 
system, integration does characterize many of the changes we find in the 
new world. Although varying in degree and alacrity, integration is visible in 
a multitude of economic, political and social spheres. The implications of 
global integration are subject to much study and speculation; for example, 
the very definition of state sovereignty is being reevaluated and the 
existence of a true hegemon being queried. For purposes of this study, we 
are asking what it now means to be a ―neighbor‖ in this new international 
system, paying close attention to the issue and significance of proximity. We 
first briefly review the literature on geography and war, and then make 
recommendations for refining the concept and measures of contiguity. 
Appreciably resurfacing in political science research are multidisciplinary 
approaches to studying state behavior and in particular international 
conflict. Empirical studies focusing on the nature of war are, with few 
exceptions, now routinely incorporating geography concerns with political 
science observations. For example, who fights who is frequently explained in 
part by ascertaining the physical proximity of the players. Thus contiguity 
has come to predict conflict. To put it quite simply, we find that it is 
neighbors who fight each other. As early as the turn of the twentieth century 
scholars carefully scrutinized this relationship between geography and 
international relations. A British statesman of the time eloquently observed 
that borders were ―the razor‘s edge on which hang suspended the modern 
issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations‖ (Curzon 1908: 7). 
While a consensus of sorts has been reached today about the import of 
borders on interstate conflict, it is not clear that political scientists have 
learned two fundamental geography lessons: first, borders and systems are a 
mélange of both physical and social constructs, and second, they are not 
static. Indeed, despite the fact that the numbers of and the sizes of states and 
their neighborhoods contract and expand over time, political studies for the 
most part do not take into account the changing scope and significance of 
the contiguity-conflict relationship. Dominating political science research is 
the view that borders are merely spatial delineations between one sovereign 
territory and another, with the argument following that neighbors are those 
who share such demarcations. Conflict between two or more states is 
therefore associated with being adjacent in this respect. But alternative 
perspectives of what it means to be adjoined may provide new insights into 
the nature of war and peace. Aside from spatial considerations, temporal 
and contextual aspects may better determine who our neighbors are; for 
example, in light of new technologies that quickly and effectively facilitate 
exchange, neighbors might now be more than simply a stone‘s throw away. 
Predicting and explaining conflict by taking into account the magnitude of 
geographical attributes has come full circle, as Diehl observes (1991). From 
Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman‘s pre-World War II theories to those of the 
Sprouts, Starr, and O‘Loughlin of more contemporary times, the study of 
geography and world politics reflects a decidedly cyclical approach to the 
treatment of international conflict. Attempts to explain state behavior in 
terms of geographic attributes clearly dominated the early part of the 
twentieth century. Then, following the Second World War and dawning of 
the nuclear age, a shift towards economic and psychological models and a 
minimizing of geographical dimensions characterized the study. Of late, 
however, there has been renewed attention paid to the discipline of 
geography as a substantial and integral part of international relations. 
Pre-World War II Approaches to Assessing Geography and Conflict 
Beginning with the observations of early political geographers such as 
Ratzel, international behavior was clearly tied to spatial relations. During a 
time when intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations were fairly 
nonexistent, it was only the sovereign state that assumed the role of political 
player in the world arena. State political and military actions were seen 
influenced by technological constraints on distance; communications, 
weaponry, and transport determined state strategies and relations. A 
German natural scientist, Ratzel likened the state to a living organism 
attached to the earth and competing with other states for living space. His 
Politische Geographie published in 1897 organized spatial political data in a 
systematic framework. A state‘s frontier or border should not be considered 
a line, he argued, but rather as a shifting zone of assimilation. Ratzel‘s ideas 
subsequently influenced Nazi nationalists and military geographers bent on 
justifying German territorial expansion. At a time when earlier Darwinian 
theories spawned similar analogies, Ratzel‘s organic theory logically 
extended to state survival and illustrated how states might be strengthened 
by seizing key resources and occupying strategic locations. 
A contemporary of Ratzel and an American admiral, Mahan was also 
intrigued with parallels between the natural world and the political state. In 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan (1890) emphasized that world 
economic domination rests with control of the seas and that the 
development of sea power incorporates a number of factors including 
geographical position, physical geography, and maritime boundaries. 
Technology to transport armies and supplies by sea was superior to that 
available to move them over land. Equating power and world hegemony 
then on naval capabilities, Mahan urged the United States to adopt maritime 
policies conducive to controlling the oceans. Pioneering the concept of 
―shatterbelts,‖ later upon which other geographers elaborated, Mahan also 
noted the strategic importance of certain zones of instability. Shatterbelts are 
fragmented areas of political competition between the continental and 
maritime realms. They and their boundaries are fluid. 
Derived in part from Ratzel‘s organic theory as well, Mackinder‘s influence 
in geopolitical thought is legendary. Mackinder‘s aim in The Geographic Pivot 
of History (1904: 421) was to ―exhibit human history as part of the life of the 
world organism‖. The British geographer and member of Parliament 
observed that while sea power had been the key to establishing world 
power, technological advanced required spatial concepts be reevaluated. 
Mackinder wrote at a time when vast colonial empires were ruled by 
Western powers and when the focus of warfare had been on the seas. Noting 
that naval mobility had provided the means to dominate crucial 
waterways—it was the case of ruling the world by ruling the waves—
Mackinder (1919) also recognized the need to maintain power on land. The 
significance of land power became the more obvious with the development 
of transcontinental railways with an inevitable shift to the ―heartland‖ as a 
power center or land fortress. A strategic mass or core of human and 
physical resources, the heartland focuses on the interior continental 
periphery. Accordingly, survival of a state rests on defense of this 
geopolitical region. Thus power and influence are equated with the area of a 
state and so we find Mackinder‘s footprint on subsequent containment and 
domino theories in political science. For example, extending on the concept 
of the heartland decades later, Spykman in The Geography of the Peace (1944) 
identified relevant land areas around the edges of the heartland that he 
called the ―rimland.‖ By controlling another state‘s rimland, a neighbor 
could increase its own opportunities for expansion while preventing the 
other from expanding its interior power core. 
We find that these early theoretical frameworks for understanding 
international conflict rest entirely on spatial constraints and the available 
technology to overcome those restraints. Power relations were based on 
distance and on the size of armies or navies to transport weapons, personnel 
and supplies. Early realist analyses are characterized as geographically 
deterministic or absolutist, indicating that location, resources and climate 
dictate political action, and no longer dominate the study of international 
behavior.  
Post-World War II Approaches to Assessing Geography and Conflict 
While the roles of distance and space have not been vanquished altogether 
in contemporary times, new tools of power have introduced different 
variables in the contiguity-conflict relationship. For example, advanced 
telecommunications can unite states that are relatively far apart, weapons of 
mass destruction can be deployed instantaneously to distant targets, and 
transnational organizations can complicate the identity and autonomy of 
states. In other words, in an open world system wherein states and regions 
are at different stages of development and relationships are increasingly 
complex, our neighbors are no longer just those states next door. 
Maintaining that conflict between the two states is not dictated by 
geography but conditioned by an environment with many concerns, Harold 
and Margaret Sprout were among the first to effectively counteract 
prevailing deterministic theories. Publication of their The Ecological 
Perspective on Human Affairs (1965) reintroduced the notion that influences 
such as technology, demography, resources and geography all formed a 
mileu or environment within which states responded. The Sprouts‘ 
environmental model, a triad of actor, environment and actor-environment 
nexus, suggests a variety of opportunities and constraints upon the decision 
makers in a state. Borrowing from the early 1900s French school of 
environmental possibilism, the Sprouts argue that such possibilism does not 
dictate that a state will act in a certain manner but merely indicates how 
environment can influence state behavior. The milieu, they state, is not a 
directive or compulsion for a specific action but simply a set of opportunities 
and limitations that provides cues as to the likelihood of particular 
outcomes. The possibilities for conflict then are influenced as easily by 
geography as by other factors. Later expanding upon this model, the Sprouts 
(1969) proffer cognitive behaviorism as an alternative to determinism. They 
describe a psychological milieu in which the decision maker‘s past 
experience, assumptions and perceptions about his environment contribute 
to the choices he makes. The structure of opportunities and constraints as 
described by the Sprouts illustrates a linkage between geography and 
international relations. It is a relationship that deals with contexts in which 
geopolitical factors in the environment assume multifaceted dimensions of 
behavioral patterns and distribution of people and resources.  
A unique geographical theory of proximity began to materialize during the 
period in which the Sprouts wrote and built upon studies of opportunity 
and willingness. Boulding in Conflict and Defense (1962) considered threat 
perception and the role of uncertainty as geographical components of his 
―loss-of-strength gradient.‖ States vary in their political or military ability to 
influence events in certain areas. These areas are zones of viability and are 
primarily a function of geography. Where states can exercise more 
sovereignty and power they are more viable; as their degree of influence 
diminishes further away from home base, state viability becomes more 
constrained or nonexistent. The loss-of-strength gradient suggests that 
distance may entail decision makers to reevaluate risks and so can affect the 
desirability or likelihood to engage in conflict. In as much as this distance 
decay imposes constraints on decision makers by illuminating logistic 
possibilities posed by geography, the theory is consistent with the 
environmental possibilism of the Sprouts.  
The importance of choice is highlighted in subsequent studies by colleagues 
Starr and Most. How humans see their environment affects future choices. 
Developing his concepts of opportunity and willingness from the Sprouts 
and Boulding, Starr forged a frequently utilized framework for explaining 
international behavior. The first component of this model—opportunity—is 
closely aligned with the concept of environmental possibilism. Starr says 
opportunity is the ―possibility of interaction between entities or behavioral 
units of some kind‖ with the implication that an event will most likely occur 
if its chances to occur are great (Starr 1978). Opportunities or possibilities 
vary at any given time due to technology, social institutions, religion, 
ideology and a host of other variables, and are distributed in the 
international system differently as well (Most and Starr 1989). The second 
element in the framework—willingness—also traces back the Sprouts‘ 
reference to perception and refers to the processes by which opportunities 
are recognized and conflict then chosen (Starr 1978). But in reviewing this 
theoretical structure, political scientist Diehl (1991) is careful to note that 
while both opportunity and willingness must be present before a decision 
maker elects to go to war, they do not appear sufficient conditions for 
conflict. Nevertheless, geopolitical factors do provide for the structure and 
serve to link the environment with political behavior. Starr and others 
illustrate this by building upon the behavioral model to include interaction 
and diffusion effects, specifically looking for groups that are salient or 
important to each other (Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990). 
Proximity is a consideration in the study of conflict between states but 
geographical proximity is just one way of measuring distance and 
determining ease of interaction. Boulding‘s loss-of-strength gradient 
resurfaces in Starr‘s discussion of salience when assessing the ease of 
interaction between states. Here, in terms of location, neighbors have the 
opportunity, willingness and ability to interact more viably than states 
separated by great distances. Earlier studies demonstrate, in fact, that the 
interaction between neighboring states is greater than for others (Cobb and 
Elder 1971). The focus in this observation is on physical borders or 
geographic space, but as Starr (1991) argues, proximity is not always 
measured so narrowly. Sometimes it may refer to attribute or behavioral 
space. For example, distributional patterns in alliances, institutions and 
resources could also determine the distance between states and thus explain 
more fully salience and the ease of interaction in the world system. Further, 
he adds, spatial and temporal constraints of topography or physical barriers 
can be overcome by technology so that the meaning of the geographic 
environment is changed. 
Among contemporary studies in political geography correlating spatial 
variables to international relations, O‘Loughlin and Anselin (1991) present a 
unique methodology for relinking the two disciplines. Applying spatial 
econometric models to the study of conflict, they find that space is as 
important an explanation for war as are the traditional military, political and 
socioeconomic reasons extolled by others. For example, powerful states with 
a global reach will exhibit less spatial dependence in interstate relations; that 
is, borders will not be as constraining to them. Decisions to war will be 
reached differently for these states than for others. Thus social relations must 
also be examined in spatial contexts, they note. Explaining levels of conflict 
and cooperation among states and regions then requires careful specification 
of all attributes including spatial variables such as dependence and 
heterogeneity. Despite their efforts, however, O‘Loughlin and Anselin find 
that their analyses explain the total level of cooperation or conflict of 
individual states adequately but suffer in explaining actual patterns of 
interactions between neighbors. The challenge to do so has recently been 
undertaken by other quantitative researchers, such as Braithwaite, who 
maps geographical distributions of ―hot spots‖ of international conflict 
occurring from 1816 to 2001 (2005; 2006). He suggests that these non-random 
concentrations of armed violence may support the opportunity-willingness 
hypothesis of earlier studies focusing on spatial contiguity. 
Evaluating Geography as a Condition or Cause for Conflict 
Even while looking at neighbors in the narrowest of terms there is not 
agreement on the extent to which contiguity affects conflict. Starr and Most 
(1980) argue that while geographic space is a relevant component of conflict, 
it is not a sufficient cause. However, they do note that there is a spatial 
diffusion effect of war in which the prospect of conflict in one state is 
affected by the presence of conflict in another. Due to increased uncertainty 
and among other reasons, warring borders can increase the likelihood of 
conflict. Borders nevertheless do not cause war, they warn. Bremer (1982) 
observes that wars generally spread within regions and not from region to 
region. He also considers these effects of diffusion and agrees that while the 
spatial dimension of international conflict is of considerable import, it is not 
causal. Further addressing geographic proximity issues, Diehl (1985) 
suggests it is not the sharing of borders that induce one state to fight another 
but simply being close to a particular area in dispute. Also approaching the 
diffusion of war from a spatial perspective, Houweling and Siccama (1985) 
put a temporal twist to the argument. They maintain that it is not interaction 
opportunities but power distributions among states that affect the likelihood 
of conflict spreading. Power distribution is generally affected at the local or 
regional level instead of a worldwide level and conflict does seem to center 
in particular geographic regions. But they note that over time different 
regions experience different patterns of diffusion. The arguments for 
geography as a facilitator for conflict differ to some degree. Some studies 
find that shared borders increase interaction opportunities and so 
geographic proximity can structure a state‘s risks and opportunities. Others 
find that proximity or shared borders contribute to the diffusion of conflict 
to another state or throughout a region. Despite the role that geographic 
spatial considerations play, the conclusions reached by these scholars are 
unanimous—contiguity or proximity is not a sole determining factor in war.  
Some researchers, however, look at geography as more than a facilitating 
condition for conflict. Certainly territorial squabbles throughout time 
suggest that strong geographic interests drive conflict. Diehl (1991) astutely 
observes that most conflict studies have not focused on what states are truly 
fighting about. Instead of the actual stakes involved, research has 
concentrated on other factors to predict and explain war such as arms races, 
alliances, power distributions and other state or system attributes. Carefully 
sidestepping early geographical determinism theories, however, there are a 
number of scholars who do focus on geography as a source of conflict. 
Richardson (1960) early argues that the number of borders possessed by a 
state determines its chances for war, and that high level of interaction 
inevitably leads to conflict. The frequency of border disputes is observed by 
Mandel (1980) to reflect a power distribution among the participants; the 
parity argument points to the more conflictual behavior among less-
developed and weaker states. Alternatively, power transition theorists such 
as Prescott (1965) argue that a better predictor of conflict is the change in the 
participants‘ relative strength. Prescott notes, too, that it is the geographic 
importance of disputed territory that determines a state‘s willingness to use 
military force. Less of an emphasis on opportunity and a greater emphasis 
upon willingness to go to war appear to characterize these studies as a 
source of conflict. 
Vasquez (1995) offers three major explanations why neighbors fight amongst 
themselves: proximity, interaction or territoriality. It is territoriality that best 
explains contiguity and conflict, he says. Proximity arguments suggest that 
only among states that can reach each other can conflict occur. This 
encompasses the aforementioned discussions of distance and opportunity. 
But as Vasquez himself wonders, how can proximity itself cause war when 
most states are contiguous to one or more other states for long periods of 
time and yet do not fight all the time, if at all? Even if proximity serves as a 
necessary rather than sufficient condition, it is only in a trivial sense, he 
argues. As technology enables states to extend their military reach and 
overcome constraints of distance, the proximity explanation suggests that 
wars may become more frequent. The interaction explanations suggest that 
the number of conflicts will increase as states interact more frequently with 
each other. Contiguity comes into play because it promotes these 
interactions. This argument, however, overlooks the possibility that greater 
interaction across borders may lead some states to become more cooperative 
instead. Indeed, multivariate analyses support casual observations of this 
phenomenon. Dyads experiencing high levels of economic interdependence, 
for example, have fewer propensities to war (Oneal and Russett 1997). We 
should see more interactions occurring between non-contiguous states as 
economic interdependence and technology shrink the world, 
concedesVasquez. If the interaction explanation for conflict is correct then, 
we should also witness more military confrontations between those states. 
Yet the number of conflicts is decreasing. Territorial explanations are more 
powerful, providing the willingness to go to war when proximity 
explanations fail to always explain the opportunity to do so. Vasquez argues 
that wars are more infrequent among non-neighbors simply because they 
usually do not have territorial issues over which to wrangle. Reviewing 
statistical evidence provided by Holsti in 1991, Vasquez finds that for nearly 
350 years, territorial issues have dominated interstate conflict. Yet because 
he does not find that territoriality is a consistent or constant justification for 
war, Vasquez is hesitant about concluding those issues cause conflict. ―All 
that is being said is that territorial issues are sources of disagreement that 
can, depending on how they are handled, lead to war. In that sense, they are 
a source of conflict that can lead to war, but they need not result in war,‖ 
notes Vasquez (Vasquez 1995: 283). Nevertheless, he argues for the power of 
the territorial explanation and says that wars among neighbors are highly 
likely to be over territorial issues. 
It is unclear whether geographical proximity is a condition or cause of war. 
What is clear, however, is its preeminence in studies analyzing the onset of 
interstate war. The literature does not belittle in any way the role contiguity 
plays in conflict. Indeed, even in multivariate analyses finding an 
exceedingly strong correlation between, say, trade and conflict, the effect of 
contiguity remains convincingly powerful. Bremer (1992) looks at the 
conditions characterizing war-prone dyads and finds that conflict is more 
likely to occur between states sharing seven features. In order of declining 
importance they are: geographic proximity, unallied, underdeveloped 
economy, undemocratic, power disparity, and presence of a major power. 
Bremer finds that contiguity is so overwhelmingly important in explaining 
interstate war that it should be included in almost all studies of conflict now. 
But there is relatively little new literature being generated now clarifying the 
definition and effect of contiguity, an effect that is spatial, temporal and 
contextual in nature, on international conflict. A combination of geopolitical 
variables probably best describes the likelihood of conflict afforded by 
borders yet recognizing and measuring the impact of these variables has 
captured the attention of but a few political scholars. 
What Constitutes the Politically Relevant Neighborhood? 
With land covering about thirty percent of the planet, and almost all of that 
land divvied into about 200 political units, it is no wonder that boundary 
lines serve a predominant role in defining states and determining relations 
between those states. Regardless whether political boundaries have followed 
natural barriers or artificial constructs, over time they have been transient 
and reflective of conflict and cooperation among people. Boundaries 
separating states are commonly understood in spatial terms, as planes in 
space and lines on maps, and so have generally provided ease in 
distinguishing one political unit from another. Further, shared borders have 
served to identify states as neighbors in the international system in the same 
sense as adjoining property lines identify two suburban homeowners as 
neighbors. What constitutes neighbors in this sense then is the fence or the 
physical boundary line between the two units. In most empirical studies of 
international relations examining the role of contiguity in conflict, shared 
geographic borders have served to identify neighboring states. Contiguity 
has been measured in terms of distance. The literature is replete with 
findings that states most often fight those closest to them. This conclusion is 
so universally accepted in political science studies that in tests to determine 
other influences upon conflict, contiguity is now automatically designated as 
a constant variable or a given. 
Suggesting that interstate conflict differs across geographic regions, 
Gochman and Maoz (1984) observe that the number of sovereign states has 
dramatically increased since World War II with a conspicuously diverse 
distribution of geographic locales for dispute. Too, the capabilities of states 
to interact with others on a regional or global basis differ from region to 
region. Patterns of dispute behavior have consequently paralleled changes in 
the composition and size of the interstate system, they conclude. Exempting 
a small class of states from the rule that territorial proximity determine 
interaction opportunities, Gochman (1990) explains that only a few major 
power states have the capacity to overcome the geographic constraints 
imposed on political, economic and military influences. Aside from 
capability and other domestic power characteristics such as alliance or trade, 
specific geographic conditions also provide interaction opportunities. He 
acknowledges that issues and choices relating to war rely heavily on the 
decision maker‘s perception of the environment, as the Sprouts earlier 
suggested, but adds that decision making by state leaders is not always 
volitional. It is the geographic situation of the state that directly and 
significantly affects a state‘s international behavior, he argues. The relevance 
of geographic proximity given, Gochman observes that while a few major 
powers can extend their reach beyond the immediate neighborhood, it is 
nevertheless the immediate or proximate neighborhood that is the most 
relevant one for all other states. Looking at and modifying data gathered by 
Singer and Small, Gochman concludes that the relevant proximate 
neighborhood can also extend to the neighbor of one‘s neighbor, if the 
neighbor‘s neighbor has a direct interest in the relations of his neighbor with 
another. An even more interesting observation is that all neighbors are not 
the same; Gochman adds that the potential to influence another‘s behavior 
varies from state to state. For example, small states are especially sensitive to 
the activities of any major power states bordering their territory. It follows 
then that proximity to particular types of neighbors may aggravate or 
constraint conflict. 
Singer (1979: xxi) suggests that, just as in procreation, there is a mix of 
deterministic and probabilistic laws at work in explaining how states 
interact. Having war or not having war is analogous to that of having a child 
or not having a child, he says. While geneticists have a fairly sound 
command of the laws at work in their field, political scientists are ever 
searching for theoretical frameworks with which to explain and predict 
international conflict— frameworks whose reliability ―remains somewhere 
between fortune telling and advice to the lovelorn‖. Nevertheless, he is 
eager to present a model as well, one in which structural, relational and 
behavioral dimensions describe the international system. Over time, 
geographic variables are used with varying emphasis and scope to explain 
conflict, he says. To a limited extent, though, Singer notes that similarities 
between states are usually associated with closeness in proximity and that 
differences are associated with distance. 
Singer and Small‘s monumental Correlates of War (COW) project shows that 
more than 80 percent of interstate wars are among neighbors. How might 
we measure contiguity then? COW describes two states as being 
geographically proximate one of two ways: states are considered contiguous 
by land if they share a common land frontier or if a river demarcated the 
boundary; and contiguous by water if they are no more than 150 
uninterrupted statute miles apart. The 1989 COW project initially identified 
144 states in the international system over a period of 150 years and assigned 
each dyad a contiguity code; in instances where two states were contiguous 
by both land and water, the land/river contiguity measure took precedence 
and was recorded. This, because as Bremer (1995) notes, land contiguous 
dyads are slightly more war prone than those contiguous by sea. 
The COW data set has subsequently prompted a series of studies focusing 
on geography and conflict, some using these measures and others slightly 
modifying the terms of contiguity. For example, Gochman (1991) adds to 
Singer‘s distance-by-water contiguity measures by saying proximate states 
are those that are separated by no more than six nautical miles. Since the 
origin of the COW coding reflects the average distance in one day that a 
sailing ship could cover during the years of study, Gochman points out that 
modern ship technology raises questions about conceptual comparisons over 
time. Essentially, the COW schema for land and water contiguity suggests 
that geographic orientation is linked at the ability to ―get at‖ another state. It 
is this ―delineation of geographic zones‖ that comprises the politically 
relevant neighborhood for Gochman (1991: 95–108). 
Lemke (1995) refines Gochman‘s relevant neighborhood by arguing that no 
all contiguous dyads are relevant to the study of war. This, despite other 
analyses arguing that because wars are generally few and far between, 
narrow spatial and/or temporal domains provide weak support for drawing 
conclusions about which neighbors fight. Lemke, however, incorporates 
Boulding‘s loss-of-strength gradient as adapted by de Mesquita to narrow 
his field of study. Here, de Mesquita‘s formula (1981) takes into account the 
affect of advances in transportation technology on the loss-of-strength 
gradient, or a state‘s power share. The relevant neighborhood of any given 
state is then that reachable area identified by the gradient. Lemke recognizes 
a need to further refine the formula: it does not consider differences in 
terrain type and does not measure a country‘s power during given periods 
of history, he notes. And while de Mesquita‘s framework defines distance as 
being from the ―locus of power of the potential attacker and the closest point 
of its intended victim,‖ Lemke on the other hand determines distance from 
capital city to capital city (de Mesquita 1981: 104). The most notable 
distinction in Lemke‘s analysis, however, is that he does not find all sets of 
contiguous dyads appropriate for study. Some states physically do not have 
an opportunity or prospect to go to war, regardless of their being 
continuous. Lemke explains that a tyranny of distance occurs when states 
are not able to move military resources across boundaries into other‘s 
territory. Therefore, it is valid to study only those relevant contiguous dyads 
that might have had a war. ―Geographic distance and terrain type coupled 
with the resources and capabilities of states delineate who they can fight,‖ 
says Lemke (1995: 32). 
Measures of distance between two states have been predominantly based on 
land (direct) or water (indirect) data and rely on surveying common 
boundaries. But there are other approaches to determining who a state‘s 
neighbors are such as marking the distance between state capitals (Gleditsch 
and Singer 1975; Lemke 1995). The drawback to the latter measure, as noted 
by Gleditsch, is that large-sized states may well war over territory far from 
their capitals while the inter-capital proximity measure does not predict 
interaction opportunities as reliably as common-boundary measures. Still, 
nearly all measures of contiguity center on spatial attributes and clearly fit 
into the discussion of interaction opportunities afforded by neighboring 
states. After all, as we learned from Boulding, Most and Starr, and others the 
opportunity and willingness to engage in war decrease with distance. 
Gleditsch (1995) explains that distance and interaction are linked in three 
different ways. First, cost, such as transportation of resources and 
manpower, is lower at shorter distances and so lends itself to greater 
interaction with neighbors. Second, time, such as that needed to 
communicate, is less critical for transactions over short distances and also 
expedites interaction. Third, opportunity, the number of alternatives 
available to actors, is greater if there are no intervening or buffering 
locations. Nevertheless, this account does not take into consideration the 
impact of technology and economic interdependence on those links between 
distance and conflict.  
New ways of looking at the state, at the international system, and what 
constitutes a neighbor requires reevaluating the usual definitions of 
contiguity. After all, the realist assumption of a static interstate system has 
become fairly compromised in much of the recent political science literature, 
and contiguity proves not to be an immutable concept either. It has been the 
modern political geographer who has ascribed ―place‖ an intrinsically 
dynamic nature. Place is important because, ―it constitutes a ‗context‘ in 
which political conditions interact with economic, cultural and physical 
conditions…geography of a place is never constant,‖ writes Nijman (1991, 
64). 
Challenging the narrower definitions of geographic proximity, as they were 
employed in the above-mentioned conflict studies, challenges first of all the 
very definition of boundaries and statehood. Boundaries or borders are 
typically perceived as spatial delineations between distinct political 
territories. Too, borders between states are usually an expression and 
measure of state power, as Ratzel pointed out long ago. This realist 
perspective of a tidy compartmentalized global system, in which inviolate 
territorial spaces are governed autonomously, does not reflect the global 
fluidity of the contemporary era. Even Huntington observes severe 
limitations to the statist paradigm. Not all states perceive their interests and 
behavior alike. Despite the admonition that ―states are and will remain the 
dominant entities in world affairs,‖ Huntington concedes that states are also 
now suffering losses in power, sovereignty and functions (Huntington 1996: 
34). 
A Constructivist Approach to Redefining Contiguity 
What scholars have also observed is a transformation in the meaning of 
territoriality as we have previously understood it. While not articulated as 
constructivism per se, the Sprouts‘ work on environmental possibilism as we 
have seen provides early groundwork for an alternative framework of 
analysis to take into account the role of social interaction in constructing 
political environments. The viability of physical borders to determine 
political space is doubly under assault since the end of the Cold War (Luke 
1996; Rosenau 2003; Hebron and Stack 2009). As states lose control over their 
territories and populations due to massive international networks of 
economics, communications, labor and other across-border flows of goods, 
services and people, state legitimacy is arguably weakened. Political 
boundaries are less impermeable as those spaces become more ―un-stated or 
dis-instated...(where) territory becomes a pluralized space that is complex, 
flexible and discontinuous‖ (Luke 1996, 504). It is important to remember, 
nevertheless, that spatial boundaries in this respect are themselves 
artificially constructed. In fact, as the history of the Roman Empire reminds 
us, political boundaries were not always delineated by lines but were 
instead marked by zones distinguishing different peoples or governing 
groups (Matthews and St. Germain 2007). Whether defined by lines or 
zones, neighborhoods may be created and destroyed. They may mutate so as 
to reflect varying social attributes and political practices. They are 
historically contingent, and subject to contextual conceptualization. To view 
contiguity from the lens of constructivism, then, we might consider the 
discursive context in which geopolitics and globalization each fall. 
Geopolitics has, for the realist, long referred to politically bounded territory; 
location is territorially framed. On the other hand, the phenomenon and 
process of globalization is based on openness. Power is now found in 
movement, and as money, goods, services, and information circulate, 
geopolitics increasingly shifts to an unbounded space (Cuddy-Keane 2003). 
Murdoch (2005) and other post-structuralists also address this shift from 
fixed to relational space. 
The fluidity of new political spaces creates communities characterized by 
competition and negotiation of values, ideas, and objectives. These 
communities are not, as one political geographer describes, ―settled terrains‖ 
(Staeheli 2008). Political identities thus reconstructed in collapsed state 
structures such as in northern Somalia, or cultivated by novel supranational 
organizations such as the European Union, defy traditional analyses of the 
politically relevant neighborhood. The concept of neighborhood here is one 
based on shared identity, in which members have common experiences, 
such as intermarriage or sense of kinship with others in the region or across 
the globe, and is not necessarily tied to state citizenship (Hohne 2006; 
Schaller and Abeysinghe 2006).  
Thus, just as relevant to conflict as physical demarcations—if not more so—
are ideology, culture, social institutions, spheres of political influence and 
other elements of the milieu. The constructivist sees the international system 
as fluid and characterized by ongoing formations of identities and interests 
of actors, social practices and interactions (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 2001; Guzzini and Leander 2006). When there are many overlapping 
or far-reaching influences and when that socially constructed environment is 
not clearly defined, it becomes more and more difficult to ascertain the 
neighbors of a state. Among other things, boundaries between states have 
become psychological phenomena (Kratochwil 1985). Telecommunications, 
strong trade relations and rapid transport have compressed the world; 
distances have shortened in the physical sense as well as in people‘s minds. 
Certainly, integration into the transnational system has become of 
paramount concern to states as they anticipate continued weakening of their 
territorial entities.  
Conclusion 
Despite the number of scholars who, over at least the past several decades, 
join in ushering out the familiar concept of a nation-state (Touraine 1985; 
Booth 1991; Rosecrance 1996; Luke 1996), globalization has not resulted yet 
in the death of the state. Although the Westphalian concept of 
geographically distinct and sovereign political units is under serious 
challenge, the power of nationalism is still hardy, if not more so in the 
twenty-first century. A cautionary approach to discussing territory and 
spatial organization in these unsettling times is warranted, suggesting that a 
new geography may be emerging. An ―opening up of new political space for 
non-state actors to interact across national borders…and new forms of social 
organization‖ may characterize a reconstitution of identity and space 
(Marden 1997: 39). Further, such networks of association are constructed to 
allow political actors and others to behave without the constraints imposed 
by boundaries. Politics should not be territorially defined, but instead draw 
a distinction between spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement (Cox 
1998). A highly interdependent international system suggests that we shift 
our perceptions from fixed locations to the increasingly unbounded nature 
of human relations.  
Yet to some degree, territoriality does indeed remain a strategy for control. 
We have only to look at Israeli and Palestinian settlements and, among other 
issues, the continued struggle over water rights to see that physical borders 
still matter (Halter 2002). Further, the international system witnessed an 
explosion of new states with collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
nationalist claims to land. One might have predicted that at least on the local 
or regional level there would be increased conflict as new physical 
boundaries were drawn, and so there were. However, the pressure to 
integrate quickly into a transnational system for economic survival requires 
that states seek stable and nonviolent environments. A new sense of 
community or neighborhood has seemingly appeared on the horizon as a 
consequence. States share more than physical borders. As interdependency 
in production capabilities grows, for example, states joining in a larger 
organic unit will be less likely to fight each other (Rosecrance 1996). It will 
no longer be physical proximity that defines neighbors but common 
interests. Some observers note that space is becoming more homogeneous 
and less of a constraint on state action (Johnston 1994). ―Everywhere now is 
accessible to everybody; there are no nooks, corners, or retreats left…the 
result is a sudden and dramatic collapse of unconditional viability,‖ says 
Boulding (Boulding 1962: 272). What are the implications then for attaching 
less importance to geographic distance in the study of international 
relations? Gleditsch (1995) notes two. First, although there are only a 
handful of states now capable of fighting global wars, no countries are 
mutually inaccessible at least in respect to some form of communication. 
Second, Boulding‘s loss-of-strength gradient is flattened out by advances in 
technology so that there is no appreciable difference in the interaction of 
near and far states.  
Thus the shift to globalization appears to support the claims of Vasquez 
(1995) that proximity and interaction are not reliable predictors of conflict, 
and indicates that even territoriality issues might be peacefully resolved 
more frequently. Contrary to the realist paradigm, this view does not 
consider war as inevitable and all state relations a struggle for power. The 
motivation for going to war is diminished by improved channels of 
communication and linkages within the greater international community. 
Constructing a theoretical framework for understanding the role of 
contiguity and conflict is unquestionably a convoluted matter. Proximity 
cannot be defined merely in spatial terms; power relations are no longer a 
function of sheer distance. Nor are they a sole function of time. For example, 
while one might measure the time needed to span the distance between 
political entities in order to determine proximity, states vary in their abilities 
to interact over time and with available technology. The same set of criteria 
cannot be used to measure the power or influence or relations between 
members of the international system. With a review herein of various 
measures of contiguity and its impact on conflict studies, the suggestion is 
made that political scientists tap the potential of constructivist theory to 
derive new perspectives of what it means to be a neighbor. The neorealist 
and neoliberal world views and debate have dominated much attention in 
international studies within the past several decades, with constructivism 
now more frequently presented as an alternative to these two leading 
theories. Assumptions held by some constructivist scholars, such as the 
centrality of states, may not necessarily be inconsistent with those of 
material or structural theorists, but with an ontological focus on the role of 
rhetoric in constructing social reality, the constructivist is often regarded as 
more optimistic about international relations, and in some camps appears to 
present a viable challenge to conventional assumptions about how states 
behave. Yet, there remains more work ahead in constructivist literature to 
contesting views of contiguity and geopolitics as static and material. If the 
maxim is true—neighbors fight each other—new measures of what it means 
to be a neighbor are required in light of a dynamic and open system today.  
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